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are invalid because they were not "subscribed" by Deseret Diversified after 
the property description was changed. 
2. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence 25 
contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed, 
(2) Deseret Diversified could not have been the beneficiary of a trust in 
1965 because it did not exist until 1971, and (3) the extrinsic evidence of 
the plat does not prove a trust existed or that Deseret Diversified was the 
beneficiary of a trust. 
3. Deseret Diversified was not in "privity of estate" for purposes of 31 
covenants running with the land because Security Title owned the land in 
fee simple estate. 
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covenants did not arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner 
of the same parcel of land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it did not 
convey the land to a person who agreed to be bound by the covenants, and 
(3) not in "vertical privity" because it did not convey the land to Petitioner/ 
Appellant's predecessor in interest. 
5. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are invalid because under the Utah 38 
general law of trusts, the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to 
encumber the properties held by the trustee in trust. 
6. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are unenforceable under the 43 
doctrine of uniformity because they only cover a minority of the lots in 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 -
2 - 2 (3) (j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, can a valid deed be created by taking a 
signed deed and changing the property description, without the original grantor 
resigning the deed? 
2. Under the doctrine of descriptio personae, if the word "trustee" appears 
after the name of the grantee in a deed and there is no contemporaneous evidence 
that a trust actually existed, but there is extrinsic evidence that - (1) six years 
after the deed, a new corporation was formed, (2) the new corporation executed 
and recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions ("CC&R's) against a parcel of 
real estate in which it asserts it owns the land in its own right and not as trust 
beneficiary, (3) a year later that corporation signed the "owner's dedication" on a 
subdivision plat partly located in the area purportedly covered by the CC&R's, 
and (4) also, a note on that plat referred to the corporation as the "subdivider" and 
as owning and being responsible for the maintenance of the streets - as a matter of 
law, is that corporation the beneficiary of a trust suggested by the use of the word 
7 
"trustee" on the deed recorded seven years earlier? 
3. Under the Utah judicial requirements for covenants to run with the land, 
is there "privity of estate" between the beneficiary of a trust and the grantee of the 
trustee of that trust? 
4. Under Utah general trust law, does a trust beneficiary have the power to 
dispose of property held by the trustee in trust (as opposed to his beneficial 
interest in the trust)? 
5. Under the Utah doctrine of uniformity, are CC&R's that bind only a 
minority of the lots in a subdivision binding at all? 
6. Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, is a Notice of Lien a statutory 
wrongful lien if it claims three liens not authorized by the CC&R's it relies on? 
Standard of Review: This an appeal from the granting and denial of cross 
motions for summary judgment. In this situation, the standard of review is to 
review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to the trial court, 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipleline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6; Surety 
Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc. , 2000 UT 71, para. 14, 10 P.3d 338, 340. 
8 
< III \ I I O N i O Mil llllll'i n m i M I O W I N d ISMU'S \ \ ERE PRESERVED 
1. Fabrication ui uecu. R00479 - 484 ("Reply Memo1'). 
2 "Descritio Personae". R00375-378 ("Ruling and Order"). 
3. Privity of Estate. R00375, 00377 and 00379 ("Ruling and Order"). 
4. Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. R00380 
( Ruling and Order"). 
X uniformity R 00 : 1-85-486 ( 'Repl> N t< : i i n " r] 
<'• -- iaiuiing nens IU, aiith.ori.zed R 00388 389 ("Mei no in: i Si ipp' ). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
I Jtah Code Ann. sec. 25 - 5 1 ("I Jtah Statute of Frauds.") 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not one 
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered >r 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, u^i^n n: 
surrendering or declaring tlv* ^:\mc <"- u u; ] *wful agent th<»tvu»»^ 
authori zed in writing." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 9 1 (6) (Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Definitions") 
""Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on. an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: . . . 
< ; • 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57- 1 - 1 2 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect.") 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and 
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record.") 
"Every document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
10 
. . • > I T A T M M I ' T 111"1'! ' I I I ' " ' ! " ! ! ! ! " 1 i \ V ill1'1 
lint 1:1 lis a- Dtioi i, Petitioi lei seeks to 1 ia> - e a certaii 11 lotice of liei i recoi ded 
against his lot by Respondent in 1980 declared a to be a "wrongful lien" on his lot 
under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. see's 38 - 9 - 1 et. seq. 
(20n \x ' J\ il; 1980 Notice of Lien, Respondent claims to have authority under 
certain covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's) recorded on T'ily 2C 
"ctitioner claims that UK UIO^ 11 &.K S are in\ui.J, and therefore HK 'SO 
Noti :: e :)f I ie i it. is a K i oi lgfi ill. liei i I 'etitioi iei also ^laii i: is til: lose CC&R' 
authorize the liens R esp( : 
The following events lead up to this appeal. 
Back on October 14, 1965,1 .E. Bates and his wife Mae P. Bates deeded a 
large tract of land in Summit County (approximately 4,264.68 acres) by warranty 
deed to "Security Title Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah,"3 There is no 
contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed or, if it did, of w 1 10 was the 
is from this land tl lat 1:1 ie 77 lots of Forest Meadow R ai ich Plat 'T)r si ibdi\ isioi I 
p)S0 Notice of Lien/" also Addendum document "8." 
MO i>uu> UVAU. UIM) Addendum document " 1 . " 
R()(tf< 
K O i ) 
will later be created, including Petitioner's Lot 105A. 
Six years later, on March 18, 1971, Deseret Diversified Development was 
incorporated in Utah. A copy of the first page of its Articles of Incorporation is 
Document "2" in the Addendum.4 
Four months after Deseret Diversified was incorporated, it executed and 
recorded a set of CC&R's ("Reservations and Restrictive Covenants Forest 
Meadow Ranch") against 'The South half of Section 22, Township 1 South, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("the Original 1971 CC&R's").5 This 
half-section was not part of the approximately 4,264.68 acres conveyed by the 
1965 Bates deed. In fact, it is the southern half of the section where the Summit 
County Justice Center and a Home Depot are now located. A copy of the Original 
1971 CC&R's is Document "3" in the Addendum. 
Someone then took the Original 1971 CC&R's (now bearing the Summit 
County recording stamps), changed the property description to "The South half of 
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East," and recorded the altered document 
on August 19, 1971.6 These altered CC&R's ("the Fabricated 1971CC&R's") 
4
 R00294, also Addendum document "2." 
5
 R0023-26, "Original 1971 CC&R's.," also Addendum document "3." 
6
 R00475-478, "Fabricated 1971 CC&R's," also Addendum document "4." 
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were • i lot i esigi led b> Deseret Diversifie :1 ,"1 e op] T • :>f tl i,e Fabricated 
CC&R 's is Docii ill lei it " 4 " ii i the Addendum. 
About a year later, on August 9, 1972, Security Title Company, Trustee, 
recorded the "Plat for Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D."7 Both Security Title and 
Deseret Diversified signed the plat's "Owner's Dedication," which reads as 
follows; 
"Mn/v^«„i,it . i i ; ; i.*L.>c present: :;«*.- vve, me lour undeiMgneu o\\ ,u:* i 
the above described tract of land, lia\ ing caused the same to be sulniivij 
into lots and streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST Ml-.A DOW RANvTi 
PLAT 'D' do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of 
land shown on this plat as intended for public use. 
Deseret Diversified /s/ W. Brent Jensen 
Development Corporation by W. Brent Jensen, President 
/s/ Lee Ann Hunter 
Secretary 
1-^ i C(/ iA jenscn 
illegible .^nature; 
Secretar. 
I here are, however, no parcels of land shown on the plat as intended for 
public use and the plat does not identify the other two owners. 
In the upper left hand corner of the plat the following note appears: 
7
 *x' M r - .. i d e n d u m tJi JC n i n e mi in I "> " 
13 
.IS 1 Ilk. n m n ^ n v 
: iiLiti : : by 
"SUBDIVIDER'S NOTE" 
'The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and 
streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended that all streets shown 
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider "Deseret Diversified 
Development, Inc. - and shall be completely maintained by said owners. 
/s/ W. Brent Jensen I si Lee Ann Hunter 
W. Brent Jensen, President Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary 
The plat contains no language of conveyance by which Security Title conveys the 
streets to Deseret Diversified. The subdivision streets are, in fact, shown on the 
plat as part of the individual lots, and Security Title later conveyed the portion of 
the street that is shown as part of the lot now owned by petitioner (Lot 105 A) to a 
grantee who is a predecessor in petitioner's chain of title. A copy of the plat is 
Document "5" in the Addendum. 
Only the lesser portion of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D is in the southern 
half of Section 22, R1N, T4E SLB&M, the parcel of land covered by the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. The line between the northern half (the part not 
covered) and the southern half (the part covered) runs right through Petitioner's lot 
105 A, dividing it into a portion covered and a portion not covered by the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. Approximately 24 lots are split. Of course, no part of 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D is covered by the Original 1971 CC&R's which 
cover a parcel six miles to the south. The western part of Plat D is actually in 
14 
So >A 1 
s < u - f n Addendum.8 
Years passed, iii^n, on January i5, 1975, Security Title Compaq , Trustee, 
conveyed Lot 105 Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D to Jensen Investment by special 
warranty deed, duly recorded. A copy of the deed is Document "7,f ii i the 
Addendum This lot was later divided into Lot 105 and Lot 105A, After various 
mesne conveyances, on October 15, 1998, I ot 105 • "' ' as coi :i v e> ed fc ) wai i ai it;; 
is Doniment "**" in fir Adili in hi in I In I VtvmhiT l,«11 Ml «' ' ' v l ( Irahnv 4:i 
conveyed Lot i J5A Lo Petitioner/Appellant by
 4uiivi«ii41 deed, duly recorded. A 
copy of the deed is Document "10" in the Addendum. 
In the meantime, on July 25. 1980, Respondent recorded the 1980 Notice of 
Lien, claiming a lien against Lot 105 A " A copy of the 1980 Notice oi lien is 
Doci in let it' " '8" ii it, till lie , kick i ldun i.s 
Ii 1. 1:1: le spi it lg of 2(10(1 Sinniiiil I niinl\ dill • nM ml llic s p r r u l \ n \ i o r dHfiCt 
that had been maintaining the roads with taxes collected from district pn^^^y 
R0059 Addendum document "6." 
uiuenaiii.i Jocumei 
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owners. Respondent claimed lien authority under the 1980 Notice of Lien for 
assessments which it began to make for the first time.11 Petitioner then brought 
this action to have the 1980 Notice of Lien declared a wrongful lien against Lot 
105A under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. At that time, Petitioner was not 
aware that the property description in the Original 1971 CC&R's did not pertain to 
Lot 105A. 
While the litigation was pending, on April 3, 2003, Respondent recorded a 
"Clarification of Notice of Lien" at the Summit County Recorder's Office. A copy 
of the 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien is document "11" in the addendum. 
Referring to the 1980 Notice of Lien, the Clarification said: 
"The 'Notice of Lien' did not purport, nor has it been construed, to impose 
or create any other or additional lien against such properties."12 
However, no other lien is referred to earlier in the Clarification, making the 
meaning of the Clarification "that the lien described in the 1980 Notice of Lien is 
the only valid lien." 
Petitioner brought a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
R00370 "Ruling and Order." 
R00380 "Ruling and Order." 
R00261, 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien, Addendum document "11." 
16 
Original 1971 CC&R's were invalid and, if they were invalid, the 1980 Notice of 
Lien was invalid. Petitioner pointed out that Deseret Diversified did not have any 
interest of record in the land when it recorded the Original 1971 CC&R's. 
Respondent brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Deseret Diversified had a sufficient interest to impose the Original 1971 CC&R's 
based on inferences drawn from the plat. 
The trial court, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, denied Petitioner's motion 
and granted Respondent's motion. In the process of reviewing Respondent's 
proposed judgment, Petitioner discovered the property description in the Original 
1971 CC&R's did not apply and the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's had been 
fabricated. Petitioner brought a second motion for summary judgment on this and 
other grounds. This motion was denied. The trial court then entered judgment for 
Respondent/Appellant and this appeal timely followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner/Appellant's arguments are based on statutes and judicial doctrines 
- chiefly the Utah Statute of Frauds and the judicial doctrine of descriptio 
personae - but, behind these arguments is a deeper policy argument - that the 
underlying purpose of these statutes and doctrines is to allow the real estate market 
to rely on the records kept by the County Recorders. 
17 
For example, Petitioner's first argument is that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's 
are invalid under the Utah Statute of Frauds because someone created them by 
taking a signed document, changing the property description, and recording it 
without having it resigned. Petitioner argues that the Utah Statute of Frauds 
requires that the document be complete before it is "subscribed," and does not 
permit material amendments without a resigning. This is an argument of statutory 
construction, but underlying it is the deeper policy argument. To state this policy 
argument as a question - "what would be the consequences for the real estate 
market of allowing valid, recordable documents to be created by taking previously 
recorded documents, changing their terms, and recording them without having 
them resigned and reacknowledged?" 
If the Court rejects Petitioner's first argument and holds the Fabricated 1971 
CC&R's are valid, Petitioner's second argument is based on the doctrine of 
"descriptio personaeT The grantee of the 1965 Bates Deed is "Security Title 
Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah." There is no contemporaneous evidence 
that a trust actually existed. Deseret Diversified Development did not even exist 
in 1965. It was incorporated on March 18, 1971. It recorded the Original 1971 
CC&R's (which do not pertain to Petitioner's lot) on July 22, 1971. The 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were recorded on August 19, 1971. Then, on August 6, 
18 
1972 the plat was recorded for "Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 4D'" with both Deseret 
Diversified Development and Security Title Company, Trustee, signing the 
"Owner's Dedication," and with a "Subdivider's Note" in the left hand corner 
stating "The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and 
streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended that all streets shown hereon 
shall remain the property of the subdivider, "Deseret Diversified Development Inc. 
- and shall be completely maintained by said owners." This subdivider's note was 
signed by officers of Deseret Diversified but not by Security Title. 
The trial court held the inferences drawn from the plat meant that as a matter 
of law Deseret Diversified the beneficiary of a trust of which the res was the land 
covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. Petitioner argues that this is wrong. Assuming 
there actually was a trust at the time of the 1965 Bates Deed, Deseret Diversified 
could not have been its beneficiary because it did not exist until 1971. Further, the 
plat does not describe it as the beneficiary of a trust, but as a "subdivider" who is 
going to be responsible for maintaining the roads. This active role is inconsistent 
with the passive role of a trust beneficiary. Again, Petitioner makes the policy 
argument by asking a question - "what will be the consequences of holding that 
the evidence needed to trump the doctrine of descriptio personae is not evidence 
that a trust actually existed, but only evidence that a person may have owned some 
19 
interest the property?' 
If the Court rejects this second argument and holds that as a matter of law 
Deseret Diversified was the beneficiary of a trust of which Security Title was the 
trustee and the land covered by the plat the res, Plaintiff argues that the Fabricated 
1971 CC&R's are not binding on Petitioner because Deseret Diversified as trust 
beneficiary lacked the "privity of estate" necessary to make covenants run with the 
land. As owner of an estate in fee simple, only Security Title as trustee could be 
in privity of estate with anyone, and it did not sign the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. 
Petitioner argues that none of the recognized varieties of privity of estate, 
"horizontal,"" mutual," or "vertical," exist between Deseret Diversified and 
anyone. 
If the Court rejects this third argument and holds that privity of estate is 
either not required or existed, then Petitioner argues that a trust beneficiary does 
not have the power to impose CC&R's on the land held in trust under the Utah 
general law of trusts because only the trustee has that power. Petitioner argues 
that holding that a trust beneficiary has a power of disposition over the trust assets 
13
 In the companion case in this appeal, Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch 
Home Ass'n, in the Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief, he shows that the effect is 
multiple trust beneficiaries due to multiple people signing the Owner's 
Dedications of different plats in the area covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. 
20 
(as opposed to the beneficiary's power to dispose of his beneficial interest in the 
trust) (1) would make it impossible for the trustee to control the trust assets, (2) 
permit the creditors of the beneficiaries of a traditional "spendthrift trust" to reach 
the trust assets under federal bankruptcy law, and (3) cause the trust to cease to 
exist for federal income tax purposes. 
If the Court rejects this argument and holds that trust beneficiaries have the 
power to dispose of the trust assets under Utah's general law of trusts, Petitioner 
argues that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are not enforceable because they are not 
uniform. They only cover the lesser portion of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" -
the fraction located in the southern half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 
East Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Most of the subdivision (and the northern part 
of Petitioner's lot) is in the northern half of Section 22 or in Section 2L 
Finally, if the Court rejects this argument and holds that the Fabricated 1971 
are valid and binding in accordance with their terms on Lot 105 A, Petitioner 
argues that the 1980 Notice of Lien is still a wrongful lien because it claims three 
liens that are not authorized by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, and the 2003 
Clarification of Notice of Lien does not limit the Notice's claims. 
21 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are 
invalid because they were not "subscribed" by Deseret Diversified after the 
property description was changed. 
Someone created the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's by taking the Original 1971 
CC&R's after they were recorded and changing the property description from 
"Township 1 South" to "Township 1 North." This is proven by the fact that the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's display the recording data that was placed on the 
Original 1971 CC&R's by the Summit County Recorder. Copies of the Original 
1971 CC&R's and of the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are documents "T and "3" in 
the Addendum. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were not resigned and 
reacknowledged by Deseret Diversified. The signature and acknowledgment on 
them are the same signature and acknowledgment that are on the Original 1971 
CC&R's. 
The issue, then, is whether the Utah Statute of Frauds permits a valid 
document to be created in that way. The Utah Courts have consistently held that a 
document that changes a document subject to the Statute of Frauds must itself 
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comply with the Statute of Frauds. But, actually, the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's 
do not change the Original 1971 CC&R's. The Original 1971 CC&R's remain 
unchanged in the official records today, burdening property six miles from Forest 
Meadow Ranch (where a Home Depot is located). The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's 
are in addition to the Original 1971 CC&R's. Deseret Diversified did not execute 
and record a "corrective deed" to change the Original 1971 CC&R's. 
The issue, then, is whether under the Utah Statute of Frauds a person can 
create a valid deed by taking a recorded deed and changing the property 
description without having the changed deed subscribed anew. The language of 
the Utah Statute of Frauds provides that the deed must be "in writing subscribed 
by the party . . . granting" the interest, Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998). 
In 1918 the Utah Supreme Court held that this required that the property 
14
 In chronological order, cases where this is stated as holding or strong 
dicta are: Cutwright v. Union Savings & Investment Co., 33 Utah 486, 491-92, 94 
P. 984, 985 (1908); Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah 234, 244-45, 169 P. 745, 748 
(1917); Thackery v. Knight, 57 Utah 21, 27-28, 192 P. 263, 266 (1920); Combined 
Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 569, 267 P. 1020, 1032 (1928); Bamberger 
Co. v. Certified Productions, 88 Utah 194, 199, 48 P.2d 489, 491 (1935); Combs 
v. Ouzunian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 41-42, 465 P.2d 356, 358 and n. 4 (1970); Zions 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Strevell-Paterson Co., 
Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1982); Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. 
Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985); Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 
(Utah 1986); Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah App. 1995). 
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description be filled in before the deed is signed. A deed signed in blank does 
not comply with the Statute of Frauds. 
Petitioner submits that a changed property description is a stronger case for 
invalidity than a blank deed. A person who signs a blank deed should realize that 
there is a risk that it will be filed in. A person who signs a complete deed has no 
such knowledge. If valid deeds can be created in this fashion, everyone who has 
signed a deed will be at risk. 
Suppose Ms. Old gives Mr. Sharp a deed to 40 acres of property from a 160 
acre parcel. The deed is recorded. Ms. Old then dies. It then turns out that 
someone took the deed and changed the property description to cover 80 acres and 
recorded it without Ms. Old resigning and reacknowledging it. Mr. Sharp testifies 
that his agreement with Ms. Old was for the 80 acres. "How lucky," he testifies, 
"that she saw her mistake, came to me and got the original deed, and corrected it 
before she died." The only evidence will be the testimony of Mr. Sharp, so if the 
Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the changed deed, he gets the 80 acres. 
Respondent may argue that the "weight of the evidence" is that the change 
to the property description was merely a correction - in spite of the fact that the 
15
 Utah State Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 485 - 86, 173 
P. 950, 954 (1918). 
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Original 1971 CC&R's were left on the record unchanged. It may be true that this 
is "the weight of the evidence," but the issue is not an issue of fact. It is an issue 
of law. The intended purpose of the Utah Statute of Frauds is to stop triers of fact 
from deciding that an unsigned deed is valid. To change the property description, 
the original grantor must sign a corrective deed because that is the only method 
that complies with the Utah Statute of Frauds.16 
2. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence 
contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed, (2) 
Deseret Diversified could not have been the beneficiary of a trust in 1965 
because it did not exist until 1971, and (3) the extrinsic evidence of the plat 
does not prove that a trust existed or that Deseret Diversified was the 
beneficiary of a trust. 
If this Court decides the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are valid, it should go on 
to Petitioner's second argument, that Security Title Company owned the property 
not as trustee but outright under the common law doctrine of description personae. 
16
 See Arnold Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133, para. 23, 63 P.3d 721, 727 -
28; "[A] mistake in the description of the land conveyed may be corrected by a 
subsequent deed executed by the same grantor for the purpose of correcting the 
description and confirming in the grantee the title to the land intended to have 
been described in the prior deed[.]" quoting from 23 AM.JUR. 2d Deeds Sec. 333 
(1983). 
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The common law doctrine of descriptio personae treats words that describe 
the grantor or grantee in a deed as irrelevant. The doctrine was expressly applied 
by this Court in TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 1031. In that 
case, a grantor executed a deed using the word "trustee" after his name. But, he 
had taken title in his own name without the word trustee. The grantor then 
executed a second deed to a second grantee without using the word "trustee" after 
his name. The second grantee argued that the first deed conveyed nothing to the 
first grantee because the grantor held the land in his own name and not as trustee. 
In response, the first grantee invoked the doctrine of descriptio personae, and 
argued that the word "trustee" in the first deed should be disregarded. This Court 
agreed with the first grantee: 
"The unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not, 
absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, 
create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. . . . [T]he deed should 
be read and interpreted as if the word 'trustee' were not there." 2003 UT 
App at para. 12, 66 R3d at 1034. 
This Court said in dicta in TWN that extrinsic evidence may be introduced 
to prove that there really was a trust. This is in accordance with the law.17 The 
issue, then, is whether the extrinsic evidence in this case proves that a trust 
17
 Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 669, 669 (Utah 
1982). 
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actually existed and that Deseret Diversified was its beneficiary. This would be an 
issue of fact if there were some evidence, but in this case it is an issue of law 
because there is no such evidence. The burden is on Respondent to present 
sufficient extrinsic evidence that a reasonable person could conclude that a trust 
actually existed for the benefit of Deseret Diversified. 
Turning to the extrinsic evidence available in this case, the most important 
evidence is the undisputed facts that (1) the 1965 Bates Deed was recorded in 
1965, and (2) Deseret Diversified was not incorporated until 1971. If a trust 
actually existed, Deseret Diversified could not have been the beneficiary because 
it did not exist at that time. There is no extrinsic evidence an actual trust existed 
in 1965, and under the doctrine of descriptio personae that should be the end of it. 
The trial court concluded that as a matter of law the extrinsic evidence of 
the 1972 plat established that a trust existed and that Deseret Diversified was the 
only beneficiary,18 but neither the Owner's Dedication nor the Subdivided s Note 
describe Deseret Diversified as a "beneficiary" or mention a trust. 
What would a reasonable person conclude from the evidence of the plat? 
18
 R00379 "Ruling and Order." In the companion case to this appeal, Peters 
v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n., the trial court held that another corporation, 
Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc., formed in 1973, was the beneficiary of the trust as to 
the land covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. The Rulings are inconsistent. 
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The evidence of the plat is that Deseret Diversified signed the "owner's 
dedication" as an owner and is described in a note as owning and being 
responsible for the streets. The first point is that an "owner's dedication" on a 
plat is like a quitclaim deed. In effect, the signors "quitclaim" to the public the 
dedicated property interests. As in the case of a quitclaim deed, the fact that a 
person signs the owner's dedication does not necessarily mean that he actually 
owns anything. A party can sign the dedication even if he owns nothing. Deseret 
Diversified's signing is not evidence that Deseret Diversified was an actual owner, 
much less a beneficiary of a trust. 
The "Subdivider's Note" describes Desert Diversified as only owning the 
streets. The note says nothing about the existence of a trust. Nor does it say 
anything about the ownership of all the land other than the streets. Moreover, the 
active role of Deseret Diversified in the Subdivider's Note, to maintain the streets, 
is inconsistent with its being a trust beneficiary. It is the trustee who takes the 
active role in maintaining the trust res, perhaps hiring someone to do so. The 
beneficiary's role is passive. 
The active role taken by Deseret Diversified in maintaining the streets may 
be a clue to what was actually going on. The most probable explanation for the 
Subdivider's Note is that Summit County refused to be responsible for 
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maintaining the streets, so Security Title got Deseret Diversified to agree to 
maintain the streets in order to get Summit County to approve the plat. Their 
agreement was that the streets (most likely not in fee simple, but in the sense of an 
easement)19 would belong to Deseret Diversified. But, the arrangement did not 
work out, and Security Title never actually conveyed the easement to Deseret 
Diversified. 
This explanation is consistent with Deseret Diversified's signing the 
Owner's Dedication. If Security Title owned the land and Deseret Diversified 
expected to own an easement covering the streets, the County would want them 
both to sign the Owner's Dedication. 
But, does Deseret Diversified own the streets? 20 There is no deed, 
recorded or not, from Security Title to Deseret Diversified conveying to it the 
streets or any other interest in the property. Therefore, although the Subdivider's 
Note put Petitioner on inquiry notice to look for a deed to Deseret Diversified, 
19
 In Utah, roads are often "owned" by owning an easement of right-of-way 
and not the fee; e.g., Utah Code Ann. see's 72 - 5 - 103 ("Acquisition of rights-of-
way and other real property - Title to property acquired) and 7 2 - 5 - 1 0 4 ("Public 
use constituting dedication - Scope) (2001). 
20
 Actually, since Deseret Diversified was dissolved for non-payment of 
taxes in 1974 (R00293, certificate of Utah Dept. of Commerce) whatever property 
it owned has devolved to its shareholders, whoever they may be. 
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since it found no deed, under the Utah Recording Act whatever interest Deseret 
Diversified may have had is now void for non-recordation.21 
From the perspective of the law, the important point is that for extrinsic 
evidence to trump the doctrine of descriptio personae, the evidence must establish 
that a trust was actually created. This requires that the extrinsic evidence prove 
there was a (1) trustee, (2) a beneficiary, and (3) a trust res (property held in trust). 
An example of a case where the extrinsic evidence proved a trust was 
actually created is a 1981 Texas case, Neeley v. Intercity Management Corp., 623 
S.W.2d 942 (Texas App. 1981). In Neeley, Driscoll Production Corporation 
("DPC") was in the business of developing oil properties for investors. The 
investors paid in money and received assignments of the oil properties. But, some 
of the assignments were not recorded. To correct this situation, DPC as grantor 
deeded to DPC "as trustee" the oil properties it was holding in trust for the 
investors. This deed was duly recorded. Subsequently, DNC's creditors disputed 
the investors' rights in these properties, arguing that the assignment from DPC to 
DPC as trustee was ineffective under the doctrine of descriptio personae. The 
extrinsic evidence of the business dealings established - independently of the deed 
itself- that (1) DNC was the trustee, (2) the investors were the beneficiaries and 
21
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 3 - 103 (2000)("Effect of failure to record"). 
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(3) the oil properties were the trust res. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held 
that the extrinsic evidence proved that a valid trust had been created independently 
of the deed. The deed from DPC to DPC, Trustee simply confirmed the existence 
of this trust. It did not create the trust. 
In our case there is no extrinsic evidence analogous to the evidence in 
Neeley that shows a trust was actually created. In our case the extrinsic evidence 
only shows that in 1972 Deseret Diversified may have had some direct ownership 
interest in the streets in Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, not that it was the 
beneficiary of a trust created in 1965 with a trust res of 4,264.68 acres of property. 
In our case the only evidence there was a trust is the word "trustee" in the 1965 
Bates Deed, and under the doctrine of descriptio personae this is not enough. To 
trump the doctrine of descriptio personae, the burden is on Respondent to prove 
the trust existed for the benefit of Deseret Diversified by extrinsic evidence, and it 
has not met that burden. 
3. Deseret Diversified was not in "privity of estate" for purposes of 
covenants running with the land because Security Title owned the land in fee 
simple estate. 
If the Court decides that as a matter of law a trust existed in 1971 with 
Security Title as trustee, Deseret Diversified as beneficiary, and the land covered 
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by the plat as trust res, it should go on to Petitioner's third argument. Petitioner 
argues that in order for Deseret Diversified to impose covenants running with the 
land, under Utah law it had to be in mutual or horizontal "privity of estate" with 
the person who originally promised to be bound by the covenants; Flying 
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). And, in 
order for Deseret Diversified Development to be in any form of "privity of estate," 
it first had to have had an "estate" when the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were 
recorded (assuming they are valid). Petitioner argues that Deseret Diversified 
Development had no estate because Security Title Company owned the land in fee 
simple. Security Title never deeded any property to Deseret Diversified. 
American real property law is based on a system of "estates."22 In essence, 
an "estate" is a present possessory interest in real property.23 American real 
property law recognizes only four basic estates - the fee simple, the fee tail, the 
life estate, and the estate for a term of years.24 Utah does not recognize the fee tail, 
22
 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, sec. 14 - 22 (1936). 
23
 Id. sec. 9. The restatement definition also includes certain future 
interests that will or may become possessory in the future. These future interests 
are not relevant in this case. 
24
 There are variations on these basic four which can be called distinct 
estates. A fee simple can be absolute, determinable, on condition subsequent, or 
subject to an executory limitation. A variation of a life estate is the estate pur 
32 
so in Utah there are only three basic estates. 
The historic reason for this limitation in the number of estates is the 
medieval statute Quia Emptores enacted in England in 1290.25 This statute barred 
subinfeudation (in effect, the creation of new estates) but made the fee simple 
estate alienable. At first blush it seems ridiculous for modern courts to hold to an 
such ancient rule of law, but holding to the ancient rule means that people today 
know what their rights are. Today the fee simple estate, the life estate, and the 
estate for a term of years are standard packages of rights which people understand. 
An analogy is sometimes drawn between an estate and a bundle of sticks, 
with each right of the estate's owner being one of the sticks in the bundle. 
Applying the analogy to this case, the issue is who owned the stick entitled "right 
to impose permanent covenants running with the land" when the Fabricated 1971 
CC&R's were recorded? The answer depends on who owned the estate (present 
possessory interest) in the land at that time because only the owner of the estate 
could be in "privity of estate" with anyone. 
The person who owned the estate in fee simple at that time was "Security 
autre vie where the measuring life is not the tenant's life. The term of years can 
be periodic, at will, or at sufferance. Still there are only four basic estates. 
25
 Act of 18Edw.I,c. 1(1290). 
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Title Company, Trustee" because by statute, the effect of the 1965 Bates Deed (as 
a warranty deed) was to convey the whole 4,264.68 acres to it "in fee simple." 
"A warranty deed . . . shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple 
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together 
with all appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto belonging . . . ,"26 
Therefore, even if Deseret Diversified had an equitable interest in the land as the 
beneficiary of a trust, it had no "estate" and, therefore, could not be in "privity of 
estate" with anyone and, therefore, could not bind the land with covenants running 
with the land. 
The consequence of this Court following this ancient rule of law in our case 
will be that only the owner of the fee simple estate will be able to impose 
permanent covenants running with the land.27 The stick entitled "right to impose 
permanent covenants running with the land" will be part of the bundle of rights 
known as "the fee simple estate." This stick will not be part of the bundle of rights 
of the beneficiary of a trust whose trustee owns land in trust in fee simple. 
A strong policy reason for the requiring that the owner in fee simple estate 
impose any permanent covenants is that it assures that the owner in fee simple 
26
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000)("Form of warranty deed -
Effect"). 
27
 The owners of a life estate or an estate for term of years will be able to 
impose covenants for the duration of their estates, but not permanent covenants. 
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actually wants to impose the covenants. Allowing people with other ownership 
interests to impose permanent covenants without obtaining the signature of the 
owner in fee simple estate will inevitably raise the question of whether the 
covenants are binding - as illustrated by this case. 
4. Deseret Diversified was (1) not in "mutual privity" because the 
covenants did not arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner of 
the same parcel of land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it did not 
convey the land to a person who agreed to be bound by the covenants, and (3) 
not in "vertical privity" because it did not convey land to Petitioner/ 
Appellant's predecessor in interest. 
In Flying Diamond Oil, the Utah Supreme Court identified three types of 
"privity of estate" in the sense of three relationships between the covenantor and 
the covenantee that would meet the requirement of "privity of estate" - (1) mutual 
privity (a covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the same piece of land), 
(2) horizontal privity (a covenant created in connection with a conveyance of an 
estate from one party to another), and (3) vertical privity (the devolution of an 
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to 
a successor).28 The Utah Supreme Court held that "mutual" privity and "vertical 
28
 Flying Diamond Oil, 116 P.2d at 628. 
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privity" existed in Flying Diamond Oil where it held that a covenant to pay an oil 
royalty ran with the land. 
The Restatement position is that there must be either mutual or horizontal 
privity and vertical privity.29 This position is consistent with the holding in Flying 
Diamond Oil, but not necessarily compelled by it. 
In the case of a declaration of CC&R's, "horizontal privity" typically arises 
when the declarant deeds the lot to a grantee after the CC&R's are recorded. This 
sale is the "real estate transaction" between the declarant and the first grantee that 
creates horizontal privity. "Vertical privity" then arises later, when the first 
grantee sells to a subsequent grantee. 
In this case, Deseret Diversified did not sell any of the land that is now 
Petitioner's Lot 105A. Security Title sold the lots. So Deseret Diversified was not 
in "horizontal privity" with anyone. 
There is no "mutual privity" in this case because Deseret Diversified did not 
enter into a transaction with a person who had rights in the same piece of real 
property.30 "Mutual privity" is illustrated by the facts of Flying Diamond Oil 
29
 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY sec. 534 - 35 (1944). 
30
 "There is mutual privity if the parties have common rights in property." 
Note, Covenants Running with the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-law Relic1., 
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 145 (1978), cited in Flying Diamond Oil, 116 P.2d at 
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where the owner of the surface rights and the owner of the subsurface rights 
entered into an agreement with respect to the shared parcel of land. "Mutual 
privity" never exists with respect to a declaration of CC&R's because the 
declaration is a unilateral act. 
The trial court found there was "mutual privity" in this case because it held 
that Security Title was the trustee and Desert Diversified was the beneficiary of 
the trust with respect to Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D. Even assuming the trial 
court was right about Deseret Diversified being the beneficiary, there still was no 
"mutual privity" because the fabricated CC&R's were imposed unilaterally by 
Deseret Diversified and not by an agreement between Security Title as trustee and 
Deseret Diversified as beneficiary. 
There is no "vertical privity" in this case because Deseret Diversified is not 
a predecessor in interest to Petitioner/Appellant. Vertical privity arises after the 
original parties make their agreement creating either mutual or horizontal privity. 
It arises only if the person against whom the covenant is to be enforced is a 
successor in interest to the original promisor. In this case, where the recording of 
the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's was a unilateral act, vertical privity would only exist 
623. 
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if Petitioner/Appellant were a successor in interest to Deseret Diversified.31 But, 
Petitioner/Appellant is a successor in interest to Security Title, not a successor in 
interest to Deseret Diversified.32 Deseret Diversified is a "stranger" to Petitioner/ 
Appellant's chain of title. 
The trial court treated ownership of the land as an issue to be decided by 
drawing inferences from documents, not by looking to the recorded deeds. This 
determination from inferences is inconsistent with this Court's holding in Dunlap 
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2003 UT App. 238, 76 P.3d 711,where 
the lower court determined ownership from inferences and this Court reversed. 
5. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are invalid under the Utah general 
law of trusts, the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber 
specific properties held by the trustee in trust-
If this Court decides that a trust beneficiary stands in privity of estate with 
the transferees of the trustee, then it should go on to Petitioner's fourth argument — 
that under the Utah general law of trusts the trust beneficiary does not have the 
31
 In Flying Diamond Oil, vertical privity existed because Flying Diamond 
(who sought to enforce the covenant) had purchased the surface rights from 
Newton, the original promisee. 776 P.2d at 628. 
32
 The deed from Security Title to Jensen Investment is Addendum 
document "7," R0041. The trial court was mistaken on this fact, R00381, "Ruling 
and Order" ("Petitioner claims ownership of a lot of land conveyed by Deseret."). 
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power to encumber or otherwise dispose of the specific items of property held by 
the trustee in trust, and, therefore, the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are ineffective. 
This is a question of the Utah general law of trusts because there are no 
express terms of trust in this case. There is only a beneficiary, a trustee, and a 
trust res. So, the Court must apply Utah's default rules for the trust relationship, 
the rules that apply in the absence of express provisions.33 
In the language of trusts, the beneficiary is said to have "equitable title" to 
the property held by the trustee in trust while the trustee is said to have "legal 
title." The phrase "equitable title" means that the beneficiary bears the risk of loss 
if the property declines in value and chance of gain if the property increases in 
value. It does not mean that the beneficiary has a power to dispose of the specific 
items of property held by the trustee. For example, suppose T holds Blackacre in 
trust for the benefit of B. B has "equitable title" in the sense that B has the risk of 
33
 Today in 2004, the relevant Utah law is the Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
Utah Code Ann. see's. 15-1 - 401 et seq. (1993) ("Uniform Trustees' Powers 
Provisions"). It provides that the trustee has the power to subdivide and develop 
real property, Utah Code Ann. 75 - 7 - 402 (3) (j) (1993). This provision would, 
today, give a trustee the power to impose CC&R's. The Uniform Probate Code 
gives no such power, or any other power of disposition over the trust res, to the 
beneficiary. This is consistent with the common law of trusts. But, Utah enacted 
the Uniform Probate Code in 1975, well after the 1965 Bates Deed and the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. Therefore, Petitioner deals with this point as one of 
common law. 
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loss and chance of gain with respect to Blackacre. Under the general law of trusts, 
B can sell his beneficial interest in the trust (in effect, substituting the purchaser as 
a new beneficiary in his place), but B cannot sell Blackacre itself. 
If this Court reverses this ancient rule of law and holds that a beneficiary 
has a power of disposition over the assets held in trust, it will have radical 
consequences. 
(1) The trustee will no longer be able to control the trust assets because 
there will always be a risk that the beneficiary will exercise the power and dispose 
of the assets in some way. What happens if the beneficiary exercises the power 
without notice to the trustee and the trustee then attempts to exercise the same 
power? Ordinary spendthrift trust provisions (which bar the beneficiary from 
disposing of his or her beneficial interest in the trust)34 will not prohibit the 
exercise of this new power because they do not speak to power over the assets in 
the trust. As a result, traditional spendthrift trusts that do not expressly bar the 
beneficiary from exercising the power will fail because they will only bar the 
beneficiary from disposing of his beneficial interests in the trust, but not the assets 
34
 76 AM.JUR.2D Trusts sec. 121 (1992) ("General nature and purpose of 
protective trusts; spendthrift trusts generally"). 
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in the trust. 
(2) Many trusts involve multiple beneficial interests, some simultaneous and 
others in sequence of time. If A and B are simultaneous co-beneficiaries, does A 
alone have any power over specific trust assets? If A is the income beneficiary for 
life followed by B for life, followed by remainder to C in fee simple, trust to 
terminate in 999 years - does A have any power over specific trust assets? If the 
trust provides for income to be accumulated by the trustee, does the beneficiary 
have a power of disposition over the assets that produces the income? These 
questions never had to be answered under the traditional general law of trusts 
because the beneficiary had no such power. If this Court changes the rule, these 
and other interesting questions will have to be answered. 
(3) The effect of the bankruptcy of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust will 
35
 76 AM.JUR.2D Trusts sec. 130 (1992) ("Dominion and control of 
beneficiary"): 
'The very basis of a spendthrift trust - the provision of maintenance and 
support so someone in any manner that protects the assets from the beneficiary's 
improvidence - fails when the settlor has given the beneficiary the ability to 
exercise dominion and control over the corpus form. Hence, it is apparent that the 
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot be endowed with the entire disposition 
and control of the trust property. Rather, the trust must be an active one in order 
not to be executed into a legal estate or interest. Otherwise, where the beneficiary 
exercises absolute dominion over the property of a spendthrift trust, such trust 
fails." [internal citations omitted]. 
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change. A spendthrift trust normally survives the bankruptcy of the beneficiary 
intact because the federal bankruptcy statute expressly gives effect to traditional 
spendthrift provisions that bar the beneficiary from disposing of his beneficial 
interest in the trust.36 But, if the beneficiary has a power of disposition over the 
individual assets, the assets will go to the bankrupt beneficiary's estate under other 
provisions of the federal bankruptcy law.37 The spendthrift trust will survive as a 
hollow shell since all the assets will be sucked out thanks to the beneficiary's 
power of disposition. 
(4) Another consequence of the beneficiary having a power of disposition 
over the assets within the trust is that the trust would cease to exist for federal 
income tax purposes. The beneficiary's power of disposition would trigger the 
36
 Section 541 (c) (2) of the Federal bankruptcy code excludes from the 
debtor's estate the debtor's beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust by means of the 
following language: 
"A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust 
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case 
under this title." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (c) (2). 
37
 Under Section 541 (a) (1), all interests whatsoever of the debtor are 
included in the bankrupt estate unless expressly excepted. 
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case 
[go into the debtor's estate]." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (a) (1). 
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"grantor trust" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which provide that when a 
trust beneficiary has dominion and control over the trust assets, all items of 
income and deduction must be reported by the beneficiary rather than the trustee.38 
6. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are unenforceable under the doctrine 
of uniformity because they only cover a minority of the lots in Forest Meadow 
Ranch Plat D. 
Less than half of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D is located in the southern 
half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, S.L.B. & M. - the area 
covered by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. The western part of the subdivision is in 
Section 21, and the northern part of the subdivision is in the northern part of 
Section 22. In fact, approximately 24 lots in the subdivision are split with part 
covered by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are part not - including Petitioner's lot 
105A. In short, the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are not uniform. They cannot be 
enforced fairly because they can only be enforced with respect to the lots and 
38
 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Sections 671 - 679 (as amended). If the 
grantor is the beneficiary and as such has a general power of disposition over the 
trust assets, the applicable sections are 673 (reversionary interests), 674 (power to 
control beneficial enjoyment), 675 (administrative powers), 676 (power to 
revoke), and 677 (income for the benefit of the grantor). If the beneficiary is not 
the grantor, the applicable section is 678 (person other than grantor treated as 
substantial owner) which is triggered when a person "has a power exercisable 
solely by himself to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in himself." 
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portions of lots in the southern half of section 22 - a minority of the total lots. 
Under the doctrine of uniformity, CC&R's that are irrationally and unfairly 
non-uniform are not enforceable.39 So, if the Court rejects every other argument 
Petitioner has made, it should address this last argument for the invalidity of the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's - which Petitioner will make in the form of a question: 
"how can the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's be enforced fairly when they only apply to 
a minority of the lots?" 
7. Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, the 1980 Notice of Lien is a 
statutory wrongful lien because the liens it claims are not authorized by the 
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. 
Finally, if this Court rejects all of Petitioner's arguments for the invalidity 
of the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, it should address Petitioner's last argument: that 
the 1980 Notice of Lien is a statutory wrongful lien because it claims liens not 
authorized by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. The 1980 Notice of Lien claims "a 
continuing lien upon [Lot 105 A, Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D] for the payment of 
39
 20 AM.JUR.2D Covenants, sec. 160 (1995) ("Requisites as to uniformity 
of restrictions"): 
"Restrictive covenants in deeds will not be enforced at the instance of other 
property owners unless there is reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed, 
so that each lot owner is afforded protection against acts of others equal to the 
restriction on his or her own acts." 
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annual maintenance assessment, annual water share fees, special maintenance 
I 
assessments, penalties and interest on any or all of said items."40 But, the only lien 
authorized by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's is a lien to recover clean up costs 
against a specific lot.41 But, in the spring of 2000 Respondent started making 
assessments for capital improvements and operations.42The trial court correctly 
ruled "There was no reference to association assessments in the Forest Meadow 
CCRs."43 
Under the Utah Wrongful lien statute, a "wrongful lien" is "any document 
that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: . . . (C) signed by or 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property."44 So, 
assuming the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were signed by Deseret Diversified as the 
owner of the property in 1971, the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien because 
it goes beyond the lien they authorize. 
40
 R0050, 1980 Notice of Lien, Addendum document "8." 
41
 R0024, Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, page 2, para. 10., Addendum document 
"4." 
42
 R00360 and 380 , "Ruling and Order." 
43
 R00367 "Ruling and Order." 
44
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (2000). 
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The 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien does not correct this over breadth. 
It does not say, in plain English, "the only lien the Association claims is for lot 
clean up expenses." Actually, what it does is confirm the claim of the 1980 Notice 
of Lien by saying that no other or additional lien is claimed than that lien. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner/Appellant respectfully asks the Court 
to remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter summary 
judgment for Petitioner that the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien under the 
Utah Wrongful Lien Statute because (1) the Original 1971 CC&R's do not apply 
to Petitioner's lot 105A (or to Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D at all) because by 
their express terms they pertain to a remote geographic area and (2) the Fabricated 
1971 CC&R's are invalid and unenforceable because they were not subscribed 
after they were changed, as required by the Utah Statute of Frauds. If the Court 
rejects Petitioner's first argument and holds that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are 
valid, Petitioner respectfully asks that the Court remand the case with the same 
instructions based on one or more of Petitioner's other arguments - and for such 
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other and further relief as is in accordance with the law. 
Dated: August J5L, 2004 * 
Respectfully submitted: 
I si Boyd Kimball Dyer 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER/APPETLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing 
Opening Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Dated: August _S_, 2004 
Isl Boy/Kijnball Dyer 
47 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum Document 1: 1965 Bates Deed 
fr&Jci at I\ . ,U.A ^LL"i)J.U,.\iuJ... 
at M. Fee Paid $..-
b7_ - Dcp. Book_ 
Mad tax nodce to_ 
WARRANTY DEED 
F. E. BATES, also known as F. Ephraln Bates, and 
MAE P. BATES, also known as Mae Prltchett Bates, his wife 
of Coalville County of Susnit 
CONVEY *nd WARRANT to 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE, 
a Corporation of Utah 
of Salt Lake City Co^ty Salt Lake 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
"'
 r
" "Y'^:7::^J7TX\W?T^::^ OF 
§XLCJir.IJto.^ :i.yluiIjac?an7 • 
"0ct;i8 --
Pact € 2 : / • • a 4 ^ 4 ^ ^ 3 jL^^v ,
 v ? > 4 
Add,™ fa ^ .:....ffl
 H c ^ £ £ £ L i ^ ^ _ 
• ^ ^ ^ • ^ ^ ^ :• 
• fleecier, ^swjjj CounKUhfc - • 
Fea $6,504/ 
grantor s 
State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
, State of Utah 
- -BOft&XREC 
the following described tract of Uod in 
State of Utah, to-wie 
Summit and Morgan County, 
The South half of Section 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the Fist half of the East half of 
Section 20; a l l of Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28; the East half 
of the East half of Section 29; the North half and the North 
half of the South half of Section 33; the North half and the 
North half of the South half of Section 34; a l l In Township 
1 North, Range A East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(Containing ^proximately 4264.63 acres.) 
TOGETHER WITH a l l water and water rights however evidenced 
appurtenant to or used upon or la connection with said property. 
SUBJECT TO easements, restr ict ions and rights of way appearing 
of record or enforceable in law and equity, and taxes for the 
year 1965 and thereafter. 
WTTNESS the hand sc/said grintors, this 14th day of October 
Signed h» die presence of 
A. IX 19 65. 
z^s: 
STATBOFUTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAXX 
J^CoeOmissfcxi Ezpfrest 
12/21/67 • 
SSL 
On the 14th day of October A. D. 19 65 personally 
tpperred befere me 7. E. BATES, also known MM F. Ephrai* Bates, 
and MAS ?. BATES, also known as Mae Pritchett Bates, 
h is wife 
the signer s of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me dut t be yccecnttd the atma. ' 
Notary Puittc 
-Rofdlnf te . Salt Lake CltVj fit* 
Addendum Document 2: Articles of Incorporation of Deseret Diversified 
•KM b «u •**• •» ** w v " * "* ARTICLES OF INCORPdRATION OF 
7s *- ^'JU-^- *•* '*—' DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT 
MICROF" MFD 
Wo come as the undersigned, natural per 
l-***?**".^" 
the age of 21 years, have associated ourselves toge 
the purpose of forming a corporation in accordance \ti\ 
Utah Business Corporation Act and do hereby adopt the following 
Articles of Incorporation: 
ARTICLE I 
The name of the corporation shall be DESERET DIVERSIFIED 
DEVELOPMENT. 
ARTICLE II 
The duration of this corporation shall be perpetual, 
ARTICLE III 
The principle office of the corporation shall be in Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, but the Board of 
Directors may designate other places, either within or without 
the State of Utah, where other offices may be established and 
business transacted. 
ARTICLE IV 
The corporation shall not commence business until at least 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) has been received by it as 
consideration for the issuance of shares. 
ARTICLE V 
The names, residences and post office addresses of the 
incorporators are as follows: 
W. Brent Jensen, 2660 South 13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
G. Lee Rudd, 942 Fairvicw, Salt Lake City, Utah. LeeAnn Hunter, 
678 West 5300 South, Murray, Utah. 
ARTICLE VI 
The business which the corporation shall engage in shall be 
as follows* 
CJ' IH — -H31s1 i f i e r a u e m 
Addendum Document 3: Original 1971 CC&R's 
VH^ittT of &^tjLJj^aiLz£^JrK<^/> • 
I WAf<DA T UXlG^i, SVUK'JJ CO #e<X>«f*t» » 
^ ^ g f c ^ . ^ - . » . . . ! • , . I , y . - ' 
RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
FOREST MEADOW RANCH 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah Corporation, being 
the owner of the following described premises, situated within the County 
of Summit, State of Utah, to-wit: 
The South half of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; which will consist 
of all the lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions 
within this area; 
heieby desire to establish and limit the development, use and enjoyment 
of the aforesaid land by making said premises subject to the following 
express reservations, restrictions and covenants; to-wit: 
1. The owner or occupant of each and every lot of the above 
described area, by acceptrmce of title thereto or by taking possession 
thereof, regardless of whether or not the conveyance specifically pro-
vides therefor, covenants and agrees to accept, be bound by, to act in 
accordance with and not to abrogate or act in contradiction of any of the 
reservations and restrictive covenants herein enumerated 
2. The Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association (FMRPOA) 
shall and are hereby named responsible for the administration and enforce-
ment of the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated herein. For 
that purpose the FMRPOA shall appoint or elect one or more persons to a 
committee formed for the exclusive purpose of administrating and enforc-
ing the provisions herein set fotth. This committee shall be known as 
the Environmental Control Committee (ECC) and is empowered to set up 
reasonable rules and regulations to properly administer and enforce these 
requirements. This committee shall also have the power to make reason-
able exceptions, for cause showing, to any and all reservations and 
restrictive covenants herein enumerated whether specifically so provided 
or not. 
3. Thfe minimum lot or parcel size of said property shall be 
twenty thousand square feet in area, therefore no property owner of said 
property shall subdivide his lot or lots in such a manner that any lot 
or parcel shall be less than approximately one-half acre, more or less 
in area; nevertheless, no resubdivision whatsoever of the lots and 
layouts of Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivision shall be permissible within 
five years unless accomplished by other than through public advertising, 
however, in no event shall for sale signs or other visual displays ever 
be allowed on said property. 
4. Only permanent structures that are in conformance with the 
specifications and requirements of and after proper approval from the 
ECC, Summit County and any required State Agency or Organization shall 
be constructed, errected, moved on to, or maintained on said property. 
No temporary structure of any kind or size shall be permitted except 
(1) when used for a reasonable period to aid in the construction of an 
approved structure, or (2) for brief vacation periods. The term struc-
ture shall mean for this paragraph and for all other paragraphs of this 
document the following: Any building, improvement, 'snack, tent, trailer, 
mobile home, dwelling place, garage, storage shed, and any other type of 
structure having similar characteristics of the aforementioned items. To 
implement the procedure required herein a property owner shall follow 
the following steps before taking any steps towards putting a structure 
on his property: 
a) Check with the ECC to obtain any prepared 
specifications or requirements for i»aid structures. 
B00KM32 PAGE2.51, 
b) Submit preliminary plans to the ECC "for.' approval. 
c) Submit evidence that all County and State requirements 
have been complied with. 
d) After approval, proceed only in accordance with the 
directions of and in compliance with the plans approved 
by the ECC. 
5. " No structure constructed, erected or maintained on any lot 
or portion thereof shall consist of less than 400 square feet of living 
area, not including carport or garages. 
6. Only one dwelling will be permitted per one-half acre, 
although a clustering of dwellings will be permitted on multi-acre lots 
when approved by the ECCO-Special permission must be obtained from the 
ECC, before more than two structures of any kind or size shall be per-
mitted on any lot, regardless of the lot size. 
7. No structure, or any part thereof, shall be constructed, 
erected or maintained on any lot closer than one hundred (100) feet 
to any lot boundary line or road right-of-way. 
8. No signs or other advertisements shall be erected or 
maintained on said property or any structure thereon. 
9. No animals, except a reasonable number of domestic pets 
(dogs, cats, etc.) horses and livestock, may be kept, bred, cr raised on 
said property; nor may any animal including the above exceptions be kept, 
bred or raised for any commercial purposes on said property. The ECC 
shall determine what is a reasonable number. 
10. No garbage, refuge, obnoxious or offensive material or 
objects, weeds or any other unsightly growth shall be permitted to accum-
ulate, grow or remain on any said lots. The property owner shall dispose 
of any of the above described conditions and items in accordance with 
accepted sanitary practices and in accordance with the ECC rules and 
requirements. In the event any property owner fails to keep his property 
free from the above described conditions and items, then after a ten day 
written notice to so comply and the failure of the property owner to so 
act*,the ECC may enter (such entry shall not be deemed a tresspass) upon 
such land and dispose of said conditions or items at the expense of the 
owner (due and payable immediately) and any expense incurred thereby shall 
be a lien against said property in fa^or of the FMRPOA until paid in full 
and the collection of said expenses shall be permissible through all legal 
means including interest, costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees. 
11. Only natural fences and natural looking fences shall be 
permitted as boundary lines, no barbed wire or chain link fences may be 
used tor such purposes. Within the property owner's boundary lines and for 
a limited area and use only, any type of fence may be used, subject to 
ECC approval. 
12. No hunting or firearms of any nature, size or kind shall be 
permitted within the area covered by the Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions, 
except within specifically approved areas, if any, by the ECC. ^ 
13. The flow of any stream, creek or spring may not be stopped <^/ 
or dammed up nor may any lot or parcel be increased in size by filling in ^ 
the water that abutts it. The elevation of any lot shall not be changed j^j 
so as to materially effect the surface elevation or grade of the surround-^ 
ing lots. No rock, gravel or clay shall be excavated or removed from any 
lot for commercial purposes. . 
14. All vehicles operated on said property shall be properly ^ 
licensed, inspected and maintained so as not to croate a.dangerous sit- ~ , 
uation, become a nuisance, nor emit unreasonable smoke, oil or noise; — 
said vehicles shall be operated only on the properly defined roads and Q 
rights-of-ways and not in any manner which will cause damage or harm to th^Q 
natural environment and landscape of said property. The ECC shall hive 
the power to restrict the use of any vehicle which creates such a nusiance 
or noise so as to prevent the majority from the proper enjoyment of their 
property. 
15. Extreme caution must be exercised in the handling of fire, 
therefore no open fires shall be permitted except in areas and/or devices 
such as fire pits, approved by the ECC. A fire extinguisher shall be 
-2-
required before any fire of any size may be started (ignited). The ECC 
shall properly provide notice of these requirements to all property users 
and set up fines and penalties for there violation. 
16. The development of facilities for the disposal of sewage 
waste shall be accomplished only after approval and inspection of and in 
accordance with rules and regulations of the Utah State Division of 
Health and the Summit County Health Department and specifically Part IV 
of the Code of Waste Disposal Regulations, Utah State Division of Health. 
17. Deseret Diversified Development, does reserve the right with 
respect to the property covered hereby to determine the course, extent anc 
direction of any easements necessary for the purpose of installing and 
maintaining any public utility facilities and for such other purposes 
commonly incidental to the development of said property. All claims for 
damages, if any, arising out of the construction, maintenance and repair 
of utilities or on account of temporary or other inconvenience caused 
thereby against Deseret Diversified Development, or any utility company 
or municipality, or any of its agents or servants are hereby waived by 
the owners. Deseret Diversified Development does further reserve the 
right to change, establish, lay out a new, or discontinue any road, street 
right-of-way or easement which may be at any time established necessary 
or not necessary for ingress or egress to and from an owner's lot, subject 
to the approval of any governmental authority, if required. The property 
conveyed in Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions are so conveyed subject to 
the right of Deseret Diversified Development, as in this Paragraph 17 
provided, which right may be exercised by Deseret Diversified Development 
without compensation to a property owner. 
18. In the event Deseret Diversified Development or FMRPOA 
desire or are required by any governmental authority to develop improve-
ments , '.including but not limited to electricity, gas, telephone, sewers, 
water, etc., all property owners, occupants, users or their assigns of 
the real property covered hereby shall connect to and become a user of 
said facilities within a reasonable time after installation and shall 
be responsible for their proportionate share of the development expenses, 
costs and charges. Said proportionate share shall be calculated on a 
per acre or portion thereof basis and due thirty days before construction. 
19. The violation of any of the reservations or covenants 
herein set out by any property owner, occupant, or person claiming under 
them or any other person shall be subject to prosecution by any other 
property owner of the real property included herein, the FMRPOA or 
Deseret Diversified Development, said prosecution may take the form 
of any legal proceeding in law or equity against the offending person or 
persons and may seek any and all lawful remedy therefor. In addition to 
the foregoing rights, the FMRPOA, the ECC or Deseret Diversified Develop-
ment jointly or severally, shall have the right, whenever there shall 
have oeen built on any lot any structure which is in violation of these 
restrictions, to enter upon the property where such violation of these 
Reservations and Restrictions exists and summarily abate or remove the 
same at the expense of the owner, which expense snail become a lien upon 
the property from which removed and any such entry and abatement or removal 
shall not be deemed a trespass. The failure promptly to enforce any of 
the Reservations and Restrictions shall not bar their enforcement. 
20. Invalidation of any of the provisions of this document by 
judgment or court order shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions 
herein, which shall remain in full force and effect. ^ 
21. Should the owner fail, neglect or refuse to satisfy and Lr>v 
discharge any fine, lien or penalty arising, hereunder within thirty ^ 
(30) days, or it should become necessary to enforce the provisions herein,^ 
the FMRPOA, the ECC and/or Deseret Diversified Development as the case ;— 
may be, shall have the right to interest on such fine, lien or penalty Q ^ 
at the rate of one and one-half percent per month until paid and shall be 
entitled to receive all costs of collection and/or enforcement including ^ 
a reasonable attorney's fee. ^ 
32 22. The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out ^ 
are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning ^ 
or occupying any lot, parcel or portion of the real property enumerated Q 
at the beginning horeof until January 1, 1990, and for successive twenty £Q 
(20) year periods unless within six (6) months of the end of the initial 
-3-
period ofs any ^twent^X20)^ear;period . thereafter a written agreement 
e j 3cuted j>yjtho^then^recordf owners ^of, more than three-quarters (3/4) in 
area'of'^said realSpropertyj^included here ia i s recorded with the Summit 
County^ Recorder^ an d£the£terms. ;of\said agreement change, modify or extmg 
In -whole ar*intpartfthe\$Teservations.,and r e s t r i c t i v e covenants enumerate 
heTeiri^Thereafter^; these 'reservat ions and r e s t r i c t i v e covenants as 
changed^modified,or extinguished by,sa id agreement sha l l continue in fo 
for^successive t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) year periods , u n t i l they are changed, modifiec 
[orj extinguished in the mannetiherein provided. 
S & # W ^ * N w i T N E S S WHEREOF/'DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT has 
cauifid th i s document to be executed in i t s name by i t s President, th i s 
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT 
ATTEST: Byg^f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Z ^ ^ 
r. Pres idency 
'STATEROF UTAH 
day of July, 1971 personally appeared before 
, who, being oy me duly sworn, did 
and 
by author-
J3ft^jthat\<hefl.is>th5 President of Deseret Divers i f ied Development 
( that sa id Instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation b 
ation executed the same. 
%*/f>. t O^AL KO^ ARY PUBLIC! df^L >f - ^ 
U V ^ f ' n ; N V Residing a t t H * ^ * U / k 6 ^ ^ £ ^ 
My Co'mm^ssion Expires: 
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Addendum Document 4: Fabricated 1971 CC&R's 
ferfiyNo.1 Y/BB Oct : . 
RECORDED'.. '- » *l ' x \A~ ^'0 a 
REQUEST of u l ^ i a , <-M y# • j t^ i 
F££ WANDA Y Kfft'GO^, fUM* «f < J » COAOiA 
$ _Ii"/' . . 8 y ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ " y ^ ^ . ^ ^ . 
fUCO.U ^7,XM7l *\/LMl.\ ..-J*/5 + 
I W A I J A T £.**.*•**, SWUk'lI C.U »• - , - « * « • . 
RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
FOREST MEADOW RANCH 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah Corporation, being 
the owner of the following described premises, situated within the County 
of Summit, State of Utah, to-wit: 
The South half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; which will consist 
of all the lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions 
within this area; 
hereby desire to establish and limit the development, use and enjoyment 
of the aforesaid land by making said premises subject to the following 
express reservations, restrictions and covenants; to-wit: 
1. The owner or occupant of each and every lot of the above 
described area, by acceptance of title thereto or by taking possession 
thereof, regardless of whether or not the conveyance specifically pro-
vides therefor, covenants and agrees to accept, be bound by, to act in 
accordance with and not to abrogate or act in contradiction of any of the 
reservations and restrictive covenants herein enumerated. 
2. The Forest Meadow Ranch Property Own 
shell and are hereby named responsible for the adm 
ment of the reservations and restrictive covenants 
that purpose the FMRPOA shall appoint or eloct one 
committee formed for the exclusive purpose of admi 
ing the provisions herein set forth. This committ 
the Environmental Control Committee (ECC) and is e 
reasonable rules and regulations to properly admin 
requirements. This committee shall also have the 
able exceptions, for cause showing, to any and all 
restrictive covenants herein enumerated whether sp 
or not. 
ors Association (FMRPUAj 
inistration and enforcc-
enumerated herein. Fo** 
or more persons to a 
nistrating and enforc-
ee shall be known as 
mpowered to set up 
ister and enforce theso 
power to make reason-
reservations and 
ecifically so provided 
3. The minimum lot or parcel size of said property shall be 
twenty thousand square feet in area, therefore no property owner of said 
property shall subdivide his lot or lots in such a manner that any lot 
or parcel shall be less than approximately one-half acre, more or less 
in area; nevertheless, no resubdivision whatsoever of the lots and 
layouts of Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivision shall be permissible within 
five years unless accomplished by other titan through public advertising, 
however, in no event shall for sale signs or other visual displays ever 
be allowed on said property. 
4. Only perm 
specifications and requ 
ECC, Summit County and 
be constructed, errecte 
No tomporary structure 
(1) when used for a rea 
approved structure, or 
ture shall mean for thi 
document the following: 
mobile home, dwelling p 
structuro having simila 
implement the procedure 
the following steps bef 
on his property: 
a) Check 
speci fication 
anent structures that arc in conformance with the 
irements of and after proper approval from the 
any requirod State Agency or Organization shall 
d, moved on to, or maintained on said property, 
of any kind or size shall bo permitted except 
sonable period to aid in the construction of an 
(2) for brief vacation periods. The term struc-
s paragraph and for all other paragraphs of this 
Any building, improvement, shack, tent, trailer, 
lace, garage, storage shed, and any other type of 
r characteristics of the aforementioned items. To 
required herein a property owner shall follow 
ore taking any steps towards putting a structure 
with the LCC to obtain any prepared 
s or requirements for said structures. 
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U) Submit preliminary plan, to the vxc for approval. 
c) Submit evidence that all County and Statu requirements 
have been complied with 
d) After approval, proceed only in accordance with the 
directions or and in compliance with the plans approved 
by the ECC. 
5. No structure constructed, erected or maintained on any lot 
or portion thereof shall consist of less than 400 so^ inixs f_c.ct—of--l -i vi ng 
area_t_jLot_incLuding carport or garages. 
6. Only one dwelling will be permitted per one-half acre, 
although a clustering of dwellings will be permitted on multi-acre lots 
when approved by the ECC. Special permission must be obtained from the 
ECC, before more than two stiuctures of any kind or size shall be per-
mitted on any lot, regardless of the lot size. 
7. No structure, or any part thereof, shall be constructed, 
erected or maintained on any lot closer than one hundred (100) feet 
to any lot boundary line or road right-of-way. 
H. No signs or other advertisements shall be erected or 
maintained on said property or any structure thereon. 
9. No animals, except a reasonable number of domestic pets 
(dogs, cats, etc/) horses and livestock, may be kept, bred, or raise' on 
said property; nor may any animal including the above exceptions be .;ept, 
bred or raised for any commercial purposes on said property. The ECC 
jhall determine what is a reasonable number. 
10. No garbage, refuge, obnoxious or offensive material or 
objects, weeds or any other unsightly growth shall be permitted to accum-
ulate, grow or remain on any said lots. The property owner shall dispose 
of any of the above described conditions and items in accordance with 
accepted sanitary practices and in accordance with the ECC rules and *j 
requirements. In the event any property owner fails to keep his property fl 
free from the above described conditions and items, then after a ton day 
written notice to so comply and the failure of the property owner to so 
act, the ECC may enter (such entry shall not be deemed a tresspass) upon 
such land and dispose of said conditions or items at the expense of the 2 
ownar (duo and payable immediately) and any expense incurred thereby shall 
be a lien against said property in favor of the FMRPOA until paid in full 
and the collection of said expenses shall be permissible through all legal
 tj 
means including interest, costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees. < 
11. Only natural fences and natural looking fences shall be ~ 
permitted as boundary lines, no barbed wire or chain link fences may be <-
used for such purposes. Within the property owner's boundary lines and forr^ 
a limited area and use only, any type of fence may be used, subject to 
ECC approval. 
12. No hunting or firearms of any nature, si'^e or kind shall be 
permitted within the area covered by the Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions, f 
except within specifically approved areas, if any, by the ECC. °^ 
13. The flow of any stream, creek or spring may not be stopped ° v 
or dammed up nor may any lot or parcel be increased in size by filling in ^ 
the water that abutts it. The elevation of any lot shall not be changed ^ 
so as to materially effect the surface elevation or grade of the surround-?* 
ing lots. No rock, gravel or clay shall be excavated or removed from any 
lot for commercial purposes. . 
14. All vehicles operated on said property shall be properly ^ 
licensed, Inspected and maintained so as not to create a dangerous sit- ^ 
uation, become a nuisance, nor emit unreasonable smoke, oil or noise; ^ 
said vehicles shall be operated only on the properly defined roads and ^ 
rights-of-ways and not in any manner which will cause damage or harm to thy-^ 
natural environment and landscape of said property. The ECC shall have 
the power to restrict the use of any vehicle which creates such a nusiancc 
or noise so as to prevent the majority from the proper enjoy/rent of their 
property. 
15. Extreme caution must be exercised in the handling cf fire, 
therefore no open fires shall be permitted except in ?reas and/or devices 
such as fire pits, approved by the ECC. A fire extinguisher shall He 
i 
a 
-2-
required before r-ny fire of any size may he started (ignited). The i:o.: 
shall properly provide notice of these requi re<nen t s to all pi UJWM" v u; >: \ •-, . 
and set up fines and penalties for t lie re violation. 
16. The development uf facilities for the disposal of sewage 
waste shall be accomplished only after approval and inspection of and in 
accordance with rules and regulations of the Utah State Division of 
Health and the Summit County Health Department and specifically Part IV 
of the Code of Waste Disposal Rcgulation_sJL_JJtjulJiU^ lleaUh. 
17. Deseret Diversified Development, does reserve the right with 
respect to the property covered hereby to determine the course, extent and 
direction of any easements necessary for the purpose of installing and 
maintaining any public utility facilities and for such other purposes 
commonly incidental to the development of said property. All claims for 
damages, if any, arising out of the construction, maintenance and repair 
of utilities or on account of temporary or other inconvenience caused 
thereby against Deseret Diversified Development, or any utility company 
or municipality, or any of its agents or servants are hereby waived by 
the owners. Deseret Diversified Development docs further reserve the 
right to change, establish, lay out a new, or discontinue any road, street, 
right-of-way or easement which may be at any time established necessary 
or not necessary for ingress or egress to and from an owner's lot, subject 
to the approval of any governmental authority, if required. The property 
conveyed in Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions are so conveyed subject to 
the right of Deseiet Diversified Development, as in this Paragraph 17 
provided, which right may be exercised by Deseret Diversified Development 
without compensation to a property owner. 
18. In the event Deseret Diversified Development or FMRPOA 
desire or are required by any governmental authority to develop improve-
ments, including but not limited to electricity, gas, telephone, sewers, 
water, etc., all property owners, occupants, users or their assigns of 
the real property covered hereby shall connect to and become a user of y 
said facilities within a reasonable time after installation and shall 
be responsible foi their proportionate sliare of the development expenses, f\l 
costs and charges. Said proportionate share shall be calculated on o (T* 
per aero or portion thereof basis and due thirty days before const ruction .LT\ 
LU 
19. The violation of any of the reservations or covenants CD 
herein set out by any property owner, occupant, or person claiming under <C 
them or any other person shall be subject to prosecution by any ether Q -
property owner of the real property in ;luded herein, the FMRPOA or 
Deseret Diversified Development, said prosecution may take the form n^1 
of any legal proceeding in law or equity against the offending person or l>r>* 
persons and may seek any and all lawful remedy therefor. In addition to ^H 
the foregoing rights, the FMRPOA, the ECC or Deseret Diversified Develop- ^ 
ment jointly or severally, shall have the right, whenever there shall ^ 
have Seen built on any lot any structure which is in violation of these 
restrictions, to enter upon the property where such violation of these 
Reservations and* Restrictions exists and summarily abate or remov^ the 
same at the expense of the owner, which expense shall become a lien upon 
the property from which removed and any such entry and abatement or removal 
shall not be deemed a trespass. The failure promptly to enforce any of 
the Reservations and Restrictions shall not bar their enforcement. 
20. Invalidation of any of the provisions of this document by 
judgment or court order shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions 
heroin, which shall remain in full force and effect. 
21. Should the owner fail, neglect or refuse to satisfy and ^ 
discharge any fine, lien or penalty arising, hereunder within thirty °y 
(30) days, or it should become necessary to enforce the provisions herein,™ 
the FMRPOA, the liCC and/or Deseret Diversified Development a- the case ^~ 
may be, shall have the right to interest on such fine, lien . r penalty 
at the rate of one and one-half percent per month until paid and shall he 
entitled to receive all costs of collection and/or enforcement including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
CD 
GO 
21. The reservations and restrictive covenants lie re in set out 
are to run with the land and shall be binding upon ail persons owning 
or occupying any lot, parcel or portion of the real property enumerated 
at the beginning hereof until January 1, 199U, and for successive twenty Q Q 
(20) year periods unless within six (6) months of the end of the initial 
o 
o 
period or any twenty (20J year period thereafter a written agreement 
executed by the then record owners of more than three-quarters f."i/4) in 
area of said real property included herein is recorded with the Summit 
County Recorder and the terms of said agreement change, modify or cxtinguis. 
in whole or in part the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated 
herein. Thereafter, these reservations and restrictive covenants as 
changed, modified or extinguished by said agreement *shal 1 jcj)jvUjDLUfi--Ln—-^o-re3-
for successive twj}rij^ y__(^  until they are changed, modified 
or extingm"sh~el^ herein provided. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT has 
caused this document to be executed in its name by its President, this 
f ** day of July, 1971. 
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT 
ATTEST: 
I S e c r e t a r y 
Ry:^^< 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
^
n tne
 SL—LJ^*Y °^ ^ uly» 1Q71 personally appeared before 
me A<+*^ , who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of Deseret Diversified Development and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by author-
aws, and said It), ^^y^^v. 
executed the same. 
ity •o^&^jr+lai 
ftC^H^fre'^cs^^A^e that said corporation 
My Commission Expires: 
/t-rt'71 
I'ARY PUBL 
Residing at: WM^~ 
BDOKM*^ PAGE?5\ 
800KMV PAGE593 
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Addendum Document 5: Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D. 

Addendum Document 6: Map showing relationship of plat to sections and lot 
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Addendum Document 7: Deed from Security Title to Jensen Investment. 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
(CORPORATE FORM) 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee, a corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of *hc State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through 
or under it to 
JENSEN INVESTMENT 
of 1425 South 700 Eas t , S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84105 
for the sum of T E N DOLLARS and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Summit 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
County, 
Lot No. 105, FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT D» according to the 
plat thereof as recorded in the office 0* the County Recorder. 
Subject to easements, restrictions, res^rvatlcns and rigiiln 
of way appearing of record or enforceable *n * a w flnd equity 
and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter. 
F-J^v 125655" M 63e 
b32 r^ L-ld-75 - /III53* 
Janaen Associates 
2.00 - - • ^^^^JUZ^a^^r 
D * * . ABSTRACT / _ ' 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that thi* deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended\by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has (kused Its corporate name and seal to be hereunto 
affixed by its duly authorized officers this 15th day of January , A.D., 19 75 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee 
• ••.S^lTEOFUfAWr 
! d j i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
CRAiy F. THOMSEN, Vice President. 
Cimnty i of' 3alt* l ike 
X / € ) * t e ' 15th 
persohally appeared before me 
*ho telni 
day of 
CRAIG F . 
,A.D. 
trie said r' 
1975 
IGHT 
CRAIi : G F . THOMSE 
is the Secretary 
January 
v 4 t — m . . THOMSEN ana 
ing.by me duly^sworn did say, each for himself, th** he, 
is the y i c e President, and she , the said L / R . WRIGHT 
of SECURITY TITLfivCOMPANY, Trustee, and.that the within^and; foregoirig instrument 
was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of,hVBoard of, Directors 
and said, CJ^Jg^J. THOMSEN and -»L. R. WRIGHT 
each d u J ^ J ^ W S B f o d to rae that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the'^l^f^aioV^oOTOfcgtion. A ^ 
.UxAj*JLfl.ML{Jj<a^^^ 
Notary Public. 
1-8-78 
..My residence is Salt Laks City, Utah 
BOOK M6> PAGE^32-. 
J^ 
Addendum Document 8: 1980 Notice of Lien. 
When recorded return t o : 
Pine Meadow Ranch Associat ion 
1104 Ashton Avenue #203 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 841G6 
3 E 5 & 0 0 2ork 3a?jt.6JZ 
? £ E -Al " • * i ' V C ^ V , SUMMIT C O . WKiOXUCH 
IHQVJLB At5!f-ACT £ 7* 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations 
and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971 
and filed for record July 22, 1971 as entry No. 113593, Book No, 
M32 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State 
of Utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and 
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch11, dated August 15, 1973 
and filed for record on September 23, 19 73 as entry 120967, Book No. 
office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
claims a continuing lien upon the following described real property 
for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share 
fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any 
or all of said items: 
M-50, 
3K Plat A, Pine Meadow RancnV Lots 1 through 01 
Plat fl, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 49 
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 05 
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through IA 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 0, Lots IS through 39 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C, Lots 40 through 06 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 0, Lots 86 through 181 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of 
any said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be 
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadow Ranch Association, 1104 Ashton 
Avenue, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating that all 
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser 
may be responsible for payment of prior delinquent assessments. 
Dated: 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
By: Qvr^ OA V- A ^ v Q ^ 
It'^ President v$ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the 
before 
who du 
t  ; g " day of )fL(^h~ » 
me Gerald P. Lang ton, the/ si/iT\e.r o 
ly .acknowledged to n* thax he execu 
1980, persona l ly appeared 
f the foregoing ipstrum^nt, 
- 7 . 
Notary p u b l i c 
Residing a t : 
§ 
/&/-* 
" ' C o n u r w ^ ^ I 
,aci
-i*ifla7 " 
0 0 6 3 3 6 3 4 BK.01523 PGOISII 
Addendum Document 9: Deed from Liftos to Grabowski. 
QFANW^.Xj)DRESS 
PO BOX 6 8 1 4 7 0 
PARK CITY, UT 2853S W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
SHELLED
 J # J .IPICS3 WHC A30XRH2D TITLE AS SHELLSTlT J . QAKASCN 
Of S I O ^ yM.T.q Councy Of 
SD hereby CONVEY (S) AND WARRAJ^S) TO 
AXEL ©^BOWSXI 
of P A ^
 CxiY County Of SUMCCT 
for the
 s u m o f T T ^ COLLARS AND 'DIHHR GXD AM3 VAHJAE1S CHsSIDERATICts1 
t h e fol^Q^f^g d^scriJied z racc of l a r d i n Summit 
S ^ c o o^
 U c 5 L h / - 0 , w i i . : 
a r anco r 
; Coptic CC «J 
I, 
S t a c e of Utah J 
DOLLARS * 
Cocncy, 
l« 
™ S * ^ R ' ) t o A S T F A 3 T a ? ^ ^ ^ 1 Q 5 f poREST1 MEADOW BAKCH, PLAT " D \ AS HEC30SD3D s' 
Of THE VFICIAL ?LAT THEREOF AT TH3 COCNIY RECORDERS OFFICE IN THE COUNT? OF 
s r M , n ? r / STAT3 C? T3TMI, BEGINNJN3 A3 A POINT OF THE NORTH CORNER OF LOT 105 A2ID 
KUNSTOG SOOTH 54 DEXSIHS3 04 KDIUTES 39 SECONDS EAST 260 FEETT; TH^MCE SOJPIH 47 , 
DBGREES 25 MIKUTSS 2 L SECONDS WEST 185 FEET; THENCE NORTH 33 DB3REES 41 MINUTES ' 
24 SjKX^pg ^ ^ 237 ^EETj 'IH^CE NOKTH 35 DEGREES 55 MINUTES 21 SECOOS EAST 100 
S™^ ^ THE POZOT O? BBSTNtTOlG. {{ 
0 0 5 2 1 3 3 9 BKU1196 PGOO 147-00H7 
ALAN SPRIGGS, SUttillT COUNTY RECORDER 
1998 OCT 29 13:23 Ptl FEE 110.00 BY MAT 
REQUEST: ASSOCIATED TITLE 
SUBJ2CV. no EAS2MEOT3, RZS^tfCTICKS ^ © RIGHTS OF WAY CURPECTLY OF R2C0-O, 
AND CE^JERAL pp^p^Ti ' TAXES Kkt THE YEAR 1996 AND THEREAFTER. 
^^ESS/Sr^/'r.arjz is) of s a i d g r a n t o r ( s ) t h i s 
SHE] EGm 
;l SIAT^OP Jir^fL T><L.kofa j ' 
! ":- - ^ ».:,. ,»! ) ss. 
, personally appeared 
s t r u a n t s , who L e i : 19 by m= chily sworn, 
executed ch= sarrie. 
ft.'''//,,,„ . o\<** 
J^JUJ^ 
NOgiRY FJELIC 
aiding ^^jdA2dJ^^d^ 
Addendum Document 10: Deed from Grabowski to Petitioner. 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
First American Title Insurance Co, 
1741 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, UT 84060 
0 0 5 5 4 9 6 6 8*0129? PG00445-00444 
ALAN SPRIGGSi SUMMIT CO RECORDER 
1999 DEC 10 15:36 Pfl FEE i!2.00 BY DrIG 
REQUEST: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO UTAH 
Escrow No. 
Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
Axel Grabowski grantor(s) 
of Park City State of UTAH, hereby QUIT CLAIM(S) to 
Forest Meadows Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C. grantee(s) 
of Summit County, Utah, 
for the sum of ONE DOLLAR and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in 
Summit County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s), this 9th day of December 1999 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
On the 9th day of December, 1999, personally appeared before me Axel Grabowski, personally known to me, or proved to 
me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity and that by his signature on the instrument the 
person or the entity upon behalf of which the person acted, executed the instrument. 
Witness my hand and official seal tT/aJb HJ^^ 
Notary Public, 
8 
"1 K! f= 
* 
o 
III 
2 
< fe 
O 
CD 
2 : 
Q 
VL 
X LU 
CT 
T 01 
OA
T 
£ 
"" ""Notary Public 1 
MARIO BENNETT . 
2200 Pirt Awm» C-1C0, P.O. Bo* 20331 
P*fc C*y, Utah 84060 . 
My Ccxmtam ExpiiM 1 
r 31,2002 
— — — -JPlJySD— J 
My Commission Expires: ; & V-02^ 
QRANl DDRESS 
PO BOX 681470 
PARK CITY, UT 28539 
PMi+-y* 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
Sta te ot 
l 
crsnces 
Sta.ce of Ucar. i 
COLLARS ! 
Couicy, 
SHELLS* J . LIFlfcS NHC A2UIRSD TTTLB A3 SHELLEY J . OftKASCN 
Of SIOUX FALLS Ccun^r of 
SD h-2T±y OCKVE*<S) Aid WARRANT (S) TO 
AXEL OTABOWSXI 
of TASK CITY Co-ncy of SUMMIT 
f o r t l » sun\ of ~ * CC«LLAR3 AND OTHSE. QOCO AND VAU3AEIS OCKSIDERATICtt 
1 
t i k follovc-ng d33cr±i*sd ^IBCC of l ard in. Sumait 
Stace of Uzan, l o - w i i : 
THE HOKIHSAST FAST a ' LOT NO. 105. FOREST MEADOW RANCH, SLAT * D \ AS MGOaDSD 
CN THE OFFICIAL PLAT TOTR20F AT TU3 COONTY RECORDERS OFFICE IN TUB CCCftTTY OF 
OTKTT, STATS C? "JTA'I, BK3INNXNa AT A KENT OF THE NORTH CORNER OF LOT 105 Z21D 
RUNNING SCUTH 54 DBOClffsa 04 HUTOTE9 39 SSCCHDS EASTT 260 FSST/ THENCE SCJJTH 47 
DEGREES 25 imZJZSS 1'- fiBXXWDS WEST 185 FE3T; THENCE NORTH 33 DBGRHES 41 1<CDKJTES 
24 S2CCNDS W£S? 237 *EETi THENCE NORTH 35 DrTTaTO 55 KDWTES 21 SEXHDS 2AST IOC 
FSHTT TO THE POINT O? 3S2TNNTM3. 
0 0 5 2 1 3 3 ? BKG1196 PGOOH7-G0147 
ALAN SPRIGGSF SUIIfllT COUNTY RECORDER 
1998 OCT 29 13:23 FN FEE HO.QO BY MAT 
REQUEST: ASSOCIATED TITLE 
SUBJ2CT CD EASIMEKTS, RZSCRlCTCCKS AND RJDGKT3 OF WAY CURRENTLY OF Z3CC5D, 
AND G2SERAL =?C?£ll1Y 1WCES FDR THE YEAR 1S96 AND THEREAFTER. 
WTIK253 C&TJC *B) of s a i d grantor (s) t h i s 
of 
, personally ajcearsd 
2433* *i* r.W« W Me* U3 JUv 6 £7) 
, s a w * *rat* &#&*& 
Addendum Document 11: 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien. 
After recordation return to: tfeff1 ^ ^^Otf , r , 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. g>/7 ' £*j«( M** V/~ 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson y^ dKs (X f ^ ^0 °f 3 
201 South Main, 13th Floor / 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 0 0 6 5 3 6 3 4 BK01523 PG01809-018 
ALAN SPRIGGSP SUHHIT CO RECORDER 
2003 APR 03 11:36 AH FEE $511.00 BY 1 
REQUEST: «ERRILL KELSON 
CLARIFICATION OF NOTICE OF LIEN 
The Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association, also sometimes known as 
the Pine Meadow Ranch Association or the Pine Meadow Ranch Owners Association, 
for itself and as the successor to the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners 
Association, files this Clarification to confirm that the "Notice of Lien" recorded on July 
25, 1980 as Entry No. 168800 at Book 163, Page 152 of the records of the Summit 
County Recorder, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A", was filed to republish and 
confirm the import of the various reservations and restrictive covenants that had 
theretofore been recorded against various properties in the Pine Meadow and Forest 
Meadow subdivisions listed therein. The "Notice of Lien" did not purport, nor has it 
been construed, to impose or create any other or additional lien against such 
properties. The referenced reservations and restrictions include the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded September 28,1973 as Entry No. 
120967 at Book M50, Pages 521 - 530; the Reservations and Protective Covenants, 
Pine Meadow Ranch, recorded September 28,1973 as Entry No. 120968 at Book M50, 
Pages 531 - 536; and the Reservations and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow 
Ranch, recorded on July 22, 1971 as Entry No. 113593 at Book M32, Pages 251 - 254, 
and again on August 19, 1971 as Entry No. 113788 at Book M32, Pages 590 - 593 of 
the records of the Summit County Recorder. 
The owners of the properties in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow 
subdivisions are members of the Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association, a 
nonprofit corporation. Memberships in the association are appurtenances of 
subdivision lots, as provided in the various reservations and restrictions referenced 
above and in the Association's Articles and Bylaws. The Association holds title to the 
roadways and common areas in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions in 
its own right and as provided in the March 20, 2000 Joint Resolution of the Board of 
Summit County Commissioners and the Governing Board of the Pine Meadow Special 
Service District, Resolution No. 2000-02, and the several conveyances made pursuant 
thereto, including the March 20, 2000 Deed of Easement, recorded as Entry No. 
561775 at Book 1311, Pages 1632 -1633 of the records of the Summit County 
Recorder, which Deed conveyed to the Association exclusive control, operation, 
construction and maintenance of the roads in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow 
subdivisions. Members of the Association are assessed for the costs of such 
maintenance and construction, and for the other expenses of the Association, in 
accordance with the Association's Bylaws. Information about whether assessments for 
any particular lot have been paid may be obtained from the Association by writing to 
P.O. Box 520897, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-0897. 
Dated this n day of March 2003 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
^ On the / 
Sgo-tf S 
ay of March 2003, personally appeared before me 
acknowledged that he signed the same as 
Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association 
, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
YCeSide.rA of Pine 
•*
:
' '•.'"; V £ \ S J NOTARY PUBLIC 
0 0 6 5 3 6 3 4 BKG1523 PG01310 
When recorded return to: 
Pins Meadow Ranch Association 
1104 Ashton Avenue #203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841G6 
C £ £ *A* « L V~ 5 \ SUMMIT CO WJtOilUCi 
wasatf / tsifAcr ^ ^ 
NOTICE OP LIEN 
KNOW A L L MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations 
a n d
 Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971 
and fxied for record July 22, 1971 as entr> No. 113593, Book No. 
M 3 2
 i n the office of the County Recorder of Sunwnit County, Slate 
o f utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and 
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch", dated August 15, 1973 
and fxled for record on September 28, 19 73 as entry 120967, Book No. 
offiCe 0f the County Recorder of Suiwnit County, State of Utah, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
claites a continuing lien upon the following described real property 
f o r
 the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share 
fees^ special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any 
o r
 all of said items: 
Plat A, Pine Meadow Ranch^ Lots 1 through 01 
Plat fl, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 4S> 
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 05 
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through 14 
forest Meadow Ranch Plat B, Lots IS through 39 
Forest Meadow Ranch °lat C, Lots 40 through 06 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 0, Lots 86 through 181 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of 
a n v
 Said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be 
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadow Ranch Association, 1104 Ashton 
A v a
^ e , Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating th<*t all 
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser 
m ay W respon-ible for payment of prior delinquent assessments. 
M-50, 
Dated: 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
It'lJ President vS 
STATS OF UTAH 
COUU^Z OF SALT 1AX£ J 
On t h e .6"' day of
 MfLtLU~ t 1980, personally appeared 
b a f o f e ,r,n Gerald P . Lang t o n , thtf si/iner o f the f o r e g o i n g lrjstrura^nL, 
'<jho yv»ly *irknowledgcd t o m#- th«/t he e x e c u t e d the samtt. . * »* % „' 
Notary ^ublit. ' / \ t ~ y 
Residing at //[faYX^^***. 
r Cofltnu won 
£*&«* Oci T? 
§3 
1381 
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